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Nicholas Davey 
The (Impossible) Future of Hermeneutics 
 
Abstract 
This paper argues that the negativity of hermeneutic experience is revelatory for the following 
reasons. Hermeneutic failure is not the equivalent of making an erroneous step in a closed circuit of 
reasoning. Neither is it a refutation. It concerns becoming conscious of an omission, an oversight, 
an unjustifiable claim to completeness and even the displacement of one interpretation by another 
more suggestive. The negative dimension of hermeneutic failure is incontrovertibly connected with 
becoming progressively aware of how, contrary to expectations, a different way of seeing is 
possible: something comes to light which displaces one’s former judgement. Consciousness of 
failure is, then, indissociable from an emergent awareness of overlooked and unremarked ways of 
thinking: “I should have been alert to this” or “I failed to take account of that.” Consciousness of 
failure is revelatory precisely because something else and something other than my expectation has 
shown itself to be decisive and in so doing has displaced my former understanding. This is the basis 
of the claim that the educative and spiritual importance of hermeneutics lies precisely in the practical 
pursuit of the impossible. It is a key contention of the paper that hermeneutic understanding expands 
and extends itself as a consequence of its impossible quest for  completion.   
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Introduction1 
   
In his 1972 essay, “Semantics and Hermeneutics,” Gadamer comments, “Hermeneutics achieves its actual 
productivity only when it musters sufficient self-reflection to reflect simultaneously about its own critical 
endeavours, that is, about its own limitations and the relativity of its own position.”2 The irony in this 
statement is obvious. Hermeneutic consciousness arises at the point when consciousness is made aware of 
its hermeneutic failures. To put it another way, hermeneutic reflection is irrevocably bound up and 
associated with the impossibility of hermeneutics itself. This is to put our theme very narrowly but such 
succinctness has the virtue of bringing into immediate focus the wide area of debate with which this 
presentation is concerned.     
 
   Impossibility is, perhaps, a matter of perspective. Given what appears to be the formal impossibility of 
hermeneutics, the argument presented here suggests that any consideration of the future of hermeneutics 
must respond to the  hidden implications of current critiques of the discipline many of which are, if 
carefully thought through, far from negative. Furthermore, the question of hermeneutics and its future 
turns on another: how binding are those philosophical commitments which seem to render hermeneutics 
impossible? Two Leitmotifen in Nietzsche’s thought initiate our our argument; the question of truth and 
the question of forgetfulness. In  Notebook 14 of Spring 1888, Nietzsche subsumes “truth” under the 
category “value” and commences a critique of the supposed moral values promoting belief in the actuality 
of truth as something in-itself (totally apart from questions of human evaluation).  
The concept of “truth” is absurd … the whole realm of “true”, “false” refers only to relations 
between entities, not to the “in-itself” …3 
                                                 
1 This paper was first presented at the University of Limerick, Eire, in March 2016. I would like to thank Drs. Eileen 
Brennan and Tony O’Connor for their constructive responses.  
2 Hans-Georg Gadamer, Philosophical Hermeneutics, ed. D. Linge, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1976, 
p. 93,  
3 Friedrich Nietzsche, Writings from the Late Notebooks, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2003,, 14(122), p. 
258.  
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As we shall see, belief in various forms of truth calls the possibility of hermeneutics into question. Truth, 
it is often claimed, is something that hermeneutics  can never arrive at.  And yet, to what extent does (or 
should) hermeneutics depend, if at all, on a belief in truth?  With regard to forgetfulness, in the essay The 
Uses and Abuses of History, Nietzsche points to a virtue that hermeneuticians with their concern for 
remembrance are themselves prone to forget: living without forgetting is impossible.4 Philosophical 
hermeneutics has become ensnared - some would argue fatally so - in the entailments of procedural 
distinctions between the sciences and the humanities. There are sound philosophical reasons to suggest 
that the future of hermeneutics requires the forgetting of such distinctions. Overcoming the pre-
occupation with the question of truth and thereby displacing the burdensome arts-science distinction, 
requires the development of a relational, participatory epistemology which in turn would secure the future 
of hermeneutics as a medium of cultural transmission, translation and transformation. To secure  a future 
which can escape the nihilism and the methodological scepticisms which engulf it, hermeneutics must 
now if not forget its past then transcend it in order to demonstrate its continued relevance to philosophy 
and cultural transformation. Both advocate and critic alike need to overcome the methodological 
prejudices of hermeneutics’ past. Re-thinking the notion of the Wahrheitsanspruch offers a way to re-
think the hindrances posed by the demand for methodological legitimacy.  
      
      Modern hermeneutics is born of the Methodenstreit between the  Natur- and Geisteswissenshaften 
articulated fatefully by Wilhelm Dilthey.5 His empathetic historical hermeneutics and its resistance to 
modes of causal explication in the social world,  led such notable critics as Theodor Adorno to strangely 
judge it as subjectivist: meaning is grasped as the reconstructable act of the human subject.6 The discipline 
has been similarly tarred by Roland Barthes and Michel Foucault for whom any appeal to authorial 
                                                 
4 Friedrich Nietzsche, Untimely Meditations, trans. R. Hollingdale, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press,1983, 
p.1983. 
5 Recent scholarship has called the history of this strict dualism. In his recent book, The Invention of Science: A new 
History of the Scientific Revolution, London, Penguin 2014, David Wootton puts the cogent argument that it was the 
New Sciences of Post-Renaissance Europe that brought the humanities (humanism) into European Universities 
rather than dislodging them from systematic learning. See London Review of Books, 29 - 30, 22 September 2016 
6 Gadamer openly declares his “disavowal of the act of meaning” in the essay “The Nature of Things” in 
Philosophical Hermeneutics,  ed. D. Linge, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1977, p. 81. 
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intention betrays the solipsistic romance of subjectivity which, as Nietzsche notes, only discovers in its 
encounters what it has projected into them, i.e. itself.7  That Heideggerian and Gadamerian hermeneutics 
should be similarly slighted is curious since both openly resist the philosophy of the subject and its 
inheritance. In his essay On the Origin of the Art Work, Heidegger avoids using the term aesthetics 
precisely because of its association with the subjectivity of response. Gadamer is more emphatic. In Truth 
and Method he asserts: “to start with subjectivity is to miss the point.” 8  Indeed, the aim of philosophical 
hermeneutics is to discover in all that is subjective the substantiality that determines it.9  
 
       Despite Gadamer’s appeal to those “substantive” structures of language and tradition which moderate 
hermeneutic interventions over and above our willing and doing, his view of tradition is frequently 
attacked as privileging subjectivity. One of the points we shall make is that any future development of 
Gadamer’s hermeneutics must pay attention to the contrary, i.e. that his account of the role of the 
hermeneutic subject in realising the moment of “address” is too weak. Proponent and critic are caught in a 
binary vice of self-endorsing assumptions. Proponents think that for the sake of methodical respectability, 
hermeneutics’ romantic heritage has to be escaped whilst critics believe that hermeneutics is irredeemably 
subjectivist.  Vattimo is surely right: to escape this predicament hermeneutics must develop a mode of 
reasoning neither based on a poetry of free association nor upon a scientific model. He and Gadamer 
frequently allude to the need to develop a rhetorical mode of reasoning. Yet neither cross the River 
Jordan. The future credibility of hermeneutics depends upon the development of an explicitly rhetorical, 
that is, hermeneutical mode of reasoning. This is tied to what I shall outline below as a participatory 
epistemology. 
 
2.  The Inheritance of Heidegger’s Ontological Turn 
                                                 
7 Friedrich Nietzsche,  The Will to Power, London, Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1968, p. 12- 13. 
8 Hans Georg Gadamer Truth and Method, London, Sheed and Ward, 1989, p. 111.  
9 Hans-Georg Gadamer op. cit. p. 302. 
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      In some respects, Heidegger’s ontological inversion of Kant’s analytic was intended to end the 
epistemological limitations of subject-orientated hermeneutics: Being is no longer subject to the subject 
but subjects the subject to its epiphanic announcements. The consequences of this“ontological turn” are 
for hermeneutics radical: it de facto  renders methodological hermeneutics impossible.  As Bewusstsein is 
more being than knowing, knowing can never fully grasp the unfathomable ground of its knowing. For 
both Heidegger and Gadamer, the claim of truth (der Wahrheitsanspruch) is when understood as the event 
of Being or the“address” of art prior to epistemological truth-claims made about the address.10 The 
question arises as to the role of the hermeneutic subject in receiving Being’s transmissions.  This is an 
issue on which the future of hermeneutics will turn. 
    
       Gadamer’s understandable wish to avoid a subject-based epistemology prioritises the agency of 
language over any hermeneutical subject. The disclosure of meaning is not a subjective act but the 
autonomous act of the language world which breaks open subjective consciousness contrary to the willing 
and doing of any hermeneutic subject. The problem with this, as Hans Herbert Koegler has pointed out, is 
that language is elevated to the status of a super-subject before which the hermeneutic subject is prostrate. 
Dialogue and negotiation are rendered problematic.11 The assertion of the ontological autonomy of 
language overcompensates for the excesses of philosophical subjectivism by refusing to acknowledge the 
necessary contribution the hermeneutic subject makes to the event of meaning. Gadamer fails to see that if 
it is to serve as the inter-active basis for transformative understanding, his commitment to a language 
ontology requires the development a participatory (relational) epistemology. Indeed, Gadamer’s notion of 
a Wirkungsgeschickte cannot operate without the selective functions first established by the differentials 
of transmission and reception. Hermeneutics, it would seem, is still caught between the objectivism of 
regarding meaning as an effect of ontological structures and the subjectivism of judging meaning and its 
interpretation to be a matter of wilful caprice.   A future hermeneutics must dissolve the object-subject 
binary in order to rethink the event of meaning as a participatory interaction between different 
                                                 
10 When Wahrheitsanspruch is translated as truth claim rather than as the claim of truth, terminological confusion 
abounds. The conceptual implications of this mis-translation are discussed below in section 5.  
11 Hans Herbert Kögler,  The Power of Dialogue, Cambridge MA, MIT Press, 1996, p. 41 
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hermeneutic agencies.  It must reconstruct meaning-creation not as a subjective response to an otherwise 
independent world but as one event within and as an expression of a world which turns out to be nothing 
other than a totality of inter-acting interpretive processes. It would be to move towards a hermeneutically 
conceived Being rather than a hermeneutics of Being.  
   
3. The Inevitability of Hermeneutic Failure 
       The explosive consequences of Heidegger’s ontological turn demand that hermeneutics’ future 
evolves not a hermeneutics of Being but a hermeneutically conceived Being. The argument that Being 
exceeds knowing renders traditional conceptions of hermeneutics as the pursuit of what is truly stated or 
meant classically impossible. The heritage of Nietzsche, Heidegger, and Gadamer as well as post-
structuralist and deconstructive critics collude in the formal impossibility of hermeneutics. The negativity 
of hermeneutics arises from the following play of elements. 
• The Hermeneutical Differential.  To understand a subject-matter is to differentiate my 
understanding of what is understood from that which is understood. Understanding is not a 
unitary but a differential process: it depends on an unclose-able differential space.  
• Hermeneutic Finitude.  All understanding is finite, arrived at from a singular perspective, 
tradition, or outlook. It is impossible to anticipate all the effects that an object-understood has 
across the range of perspectives that engage with it.  All understanding is finite because 
subject to change. The objects, processes and circumstances of our understanding are like 
understanding itself: always in motion. Consciousness can never grasp the totality of the 
relations of which it is a part: we are always more than we will ever know ourselves to. 
Whereas for Heidegger, Being precedes and is in excess of the beings that know it, for 
Gadamer Being is not so much incommensurable with being known but simply exceeds all 
knowing.   
• Hermeneutical Incompleteness: If all linguistic meaning is indeterminate, there is always 
more that can be said of a subject-matter. There can, therefore, be no formal closure to 
hermeneutics. 
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• Hermeneutic Remainder.  From the above, follows the axiom of excess or remainder: any 
statement of “x” will always invoke “x+”  i.e. those unstated (speculative) determinations of 
meaning which enable any understanding of x in the first place. 
• Hermeneutical Incommensurability: Given that the range of meanings attached to a subject 
matter is indeterminate, no finite interpretation of a subject-matter  can be fully 
commensurate with its object.  
 
The irony is clear., the very pre-suppositions of the hermeneutic operation make its failure inevitable: 
meaning, it would seem, is endlessly postponed. Negativity is not only built into the theoretical 
assumptions of philosophical hermeneutics, but threatens the outcome of any hermeneutic practice.   
Hence, all practical judgements are fallible because:  
 
• Hermeneutical practice is obliged to treat the knowledge available to it as complete and 
certain and, in consequence, runs the risk of getting its judgements wrong; 
• Hermeneutical practice involves choice and decision between possibilities and these are 
always subject to refutation by events. 
• Hermeneutical practice delivers its judgements into an uncertainty of potential applications 
over which it cannot not preside. Gadamer remarks, “every addition to knowledge is, 
regarding its significance and consequences, unpredictable.” 12 Particular practical 
judgements can always, in principle, produce unexpected effects.  
 
The poise and assuredness of the accomplished practitioner may afford a degree of fulfilment but it is 
invariably momentary. The practical or narrative identity which participation in a practice enables is 
always vulnerable to being deconstructed by the same horizons of meaning that facilitate its emergence. 
                                                 
12 See Hans-Georg Gadamer,  The Enigma of Health, London, Polity, 1996, p. 24. 
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Being a “situated subject” is not only to be enabled but also to be threatened by the linguistic and 
historical worlds one is located in. Narrative identities are vulnerable to the infinite varieties of 
description (or counter-narratives) that being in a language world exposes them to. Furthermore, narrative 
identities are “vulnerable” because they are connected with several horizons of anticipation and 
expectation. A practice might be grounded on the pre-supposition of certain linguistic meanings. Yet the 
polyvalence of meaning suggests that the locally nuanced signs and symbols of one practice can infect 
and disrupt meanings given to those same signs in another practice. There is also an inevitable dialecticity 
to participation in linguistic being:  whilst it  enables the emergence of a position, it is also capable of 
deconstructing it. What language gives, language can take away. An account of this dynamic is missing 
from philosophical hermeneutics, a striking omission in need of address. 
 
    These observations explain why any hermeneutical practice considered either as the application of a 
technique, a method of understanding or as a socially emancipatory programme will always be subject 
failure. There is an unavoidable incommensurability between what a practice seeks or   anticipates and the 
ever changing circumstances in which a practice applies itself.  The point is critical: it that suggests 
hermeneutic reflexivity and hermeneutic failure are indissociable. The moment interpretive techniques or 
applied practices fail,  hermeneutic reflexivity emerges. Put more strongly, hermeneutic reflexivity is a 
truth-effect of hermeneutic failure. Hermeneutics has here something in common with Adorno’s thought: 
negative dialectics (hermeneutics) designates a position which includes its own failure, i.e. which 
produces a truth-effect through its own failure.  It might seem that hermeneutic reflexivity is itself the 
truth effect of hermeneutic failure. Any evidential experience or insight is inseparable from a moment of 
self-conscious awareness. In this moment, the experiencer becomes aware of her experience, she becomes 
experienced.  
 
    Heidegger, Gadamer and Vattimo accept that in Being, in art or poetry, something fundamental is 
announced. Yet there always remains something negative in such epiphanic events:  “experience is always 
negative” and fuels the ancient axiom pathei mathos (learning through suffering). Thus, coming to self 
reflection, arriving at hermeneutical reflection and experiencing distanciation are all emergent 
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consequences of practical failure. “Every experience worthy of the name,” Gadamer suggests, runs 
counter to expectation.”13 We come to see things that we did not see and now realise that we should have 
seen. We become aware simultaneously of both our ignorance and arrogance. The formal asymmetry of 
Being and knowing underwrites the inevitability of practical failure and places a major qualification 
against Vattimo’s optimism that hermeneutic praxis offers a route to the overcoming of alienation. Not 
only is hermeneutical reflexivity born of practical failure but in its pursuit of praxis it is unavoidably 
subject to the possibility of further failure.   
 
     Yet there remains a positivity in the negative dialectic of hermeneutic experience. The moment of 
failure which is also the moment of consciousness becoming self-aware, marks another truth-effect: the 
emergence of practical wisdom. The negativity of experience entails humans becoming aware of their 
finitude: the limits of self-knowledge and practical reasoning are discovered. In moments of failure we do 
not so much as catch but become caught out by the realisation of what is at play within our practices. 
Failure discloses the extent of the practical ignorance that underlies our practical engagements. We 
become undone by the incommensurability of being and knowing, between being and our conscious 
doing. The wise practitioner has, then, become aware of the extent of his practical ignorance, of his 
former blindness to what was and is at play in his judgements. The emergence of practical wisdom can be 
characterised, then, as the truth-effect of failure. 
 
4:  Failure Redeemed 
“Where the danger is, there also grows the saving power”. (Friedrich Hölderlin.) 
  “Ever tried? Ever failed? No matter. Try Again. Fail again. Fail better.” (Samuel   
Beckett) 
At the beginning of  this reflection we noted Gadamer’s remark that “Hermeneutics achieves its actual 
productivity only when it musters sufficient self-awareness to reflect the limitations of its own position.”14  
                                                 
13 Hans-Georg Gadamer,  Truth and Method, London, Sheed and Ward,  1989,  p. 356. 
14 Hans-Georg Gadamer, Philosophical Hermeneutics, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1976, p. 93 
 JBSP:  HERMENEUTICS ISSUE  10 
The negativity of experience is arguably, hermeneutically speaking, revelatory. Our argument turns to an 
affirmation of hermeneutic negativity because of the positivity within it. It is precisely because and when 
interpretation fails, that an attempt at interpretation can be revelatory. Hermeneutic interpretation is not a 
method: rather,it offers methodological ploys to solicit the emergence of unexpected insights. As 
interpretation occurs within horizons of meaning already in play, interpretation can both disrupt and be 
disrupted by inducing new and unexpected possibilities for meaningfulness. It is precisely the linguistic 
nature of interpretation in the humanities that make disruption and transformation of understanding 
unavoidable. The humanities are, infact, a force for uncertainty: they simultaneously disrupt as well as 
construct their subject-matters. Each humanities discipline practises the impossible and yet it is only in 
the controlled pursuit of the impossible that the unexpectedly possible can arise. The Irish poet Eavan 
Bolan put it well: in the often nocturnal horizons of language where the as yet unsaid can be as eloquent 
as the spoken, “things are always waiting to happen” and those things can be “game-changers”, that is, 
serendipitously rather than methodologically arrived insights capable of transforming a framework of 
understanding. Meaning gathers where one least expects it. Hermeneutics and the humanities venture 
controlled risk. 
 
   The negativity of hermeneutic experience is revelatory for the following reasons. Hermeneutic failure is 
not the equivalent of making an erroneous step in a closed circuit of reasoning. Neither is it a refutation. It 
concerns becoming conscious of an omission, an oversight, an unjustifiable claim to completeness and 
even the displacement of one interpretation by another more suggestive. The negative dimension of 
hermeneutic failure is incontrovertibly connected with becoming progressively aware of how, contrary to 
expectations, a different way of seeing is possible: something comes to light which displaces one’s former 
judgement. Consciousness of failure is, then, indissociable from an emergent awareness of overlooked 
and unremarked ways of thinking: “I should have been alert to this” or “I failed to take account of that.” 
Consciousness of failure is revelatory precisely because something else and something other than my 
expectation has shown itself to be decisive and in so doing has displaced my former understanding. This 
is the basis of the claim that the educative and spiritual importance of hermeneutics lies precisely in the 
practical pursuit of the impossible.    
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    Two ideas are pertinent here: (1) Wolfgang Iser’s claim that “interpretation is basically performative; it 
makes things happen, and what arises out of this performance are emergent phenomena,”15 and (2) 
Gadamer’s notion of der Vorgriff der Vollkommenheit  (the anticipation of completeness). An aspect of 
any interpretation is its anticipation of completeness i.e.  a text moves towards saying this and towards an 
action suggesting that. The notion of Vollkommenheit is not unlike Ricouer’s concept of an ideal text: 
engagement with a complexity of shifting (textual) elements, develops a provisional image of the whole 
which becomes what is grasped as that text. The more that complexity is navigated, the greater the 
knowledge of the projected whole. The more consolidated the image of that becomes, the more it can be 
used to judge what is appropriate or not to the reading of that text. The notion of an actual completeness 
of understanding (arriving at an end-interpretation) is of course a fiction but without it, the performative 
character of hermeneutic interpretation - and the effects it induces - collapses.  This brings us to a pivotal 
point in the argument: the question is not whether hermeneutic completion is realisable but what the 
(arguably necessary) pursuit of the unrealisable gives rise to or, in otherwords, what the hermeneutic 
effects of that pursuit are. The implication is clear. Combining Gadamer and Iser, hermeneutically 
speaking, the value of the pursuit of the impossible ( i.e. Vollkommenheit) is its performative capacity to 
generate adjunctive effects. 
 
     Adorno astutely observes that, “Nothing can be understood in isolation, everything is to be understood 
only in the context of the whole, with the awkward qualification that the whole in turn lives only in the 
individual moments”. Gadamer’s notion that genuine conversation leaves its participants with an 
understanding none would have anticipated at its commencement understates the key point: the value of 
such conversations is that they can change our understanding of what was never brought into the 
conversation in the first place. Not only does the whole live on through the elements of conversation but 
changes and reveals itself differently because of the shifting nature of conversational exchange. 
 
                                                 
15 Wolfgang Iser, The Range of Interpretation, New York, Columbia University Press, 2000, p. 153. 
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      Perhaps because of its strong epistemological bias, hermeneutics has been overwhelmingly concerned 
with the relationship between the text and its reader. But of course there is more at play in hermeneutic 
engagement than this. The future of hermeneutics must attend closely to the mapping of such complexity. 
Of course we want to understand a text, an argument or a musical composition. But we also want to 
understand so much more than this. We want to understand what they enable us to understand: those 
unresolved events in our lives; failed relationships, emotional wounds, and the anxieties of identity.  
Gadamer quite understands that the projection of a semblance of wholeness and completeness is integral 
to our sense of expectancy and hope with regard to bringing resolution to the endless strands of open 
meaning running through experience. Further work is needed on Gadamer’s notion of concept formation 
and its bearing on wholeness as an imagined construct. However, the point remains. It is what the pursuit 
of this impossible brings about - its performative effects - that is key to the present argument. 
 
     The horizons of human experience are multiple. We move between and are involved in multiple 
practices and narratives and their unresolved questions. Every living practice is full of nagging tensions 
and ambiguities. Commitment to these practices is a commitment to sense making-processes whereby we 
endeavour to render their ambiguities clear. What links these practices ontologically is the horizon of 
linguistically. It unlocks  the question of how the complexity of our hermeneutic engagements and 
practices over-lap and inter-lock. The horizon of linguistically ensures that no dialogue, practice or 
language holds a monopoly on a subject-matter or living concern. We meet with the joys and fears of love 
in our own horizons as well as in those of art and literature.  It is a gross misrepresentation of hermeneutic 
consciousness to suppose that we only think about the representation of a subject-matter in the poem that 
we are engaged with it. The axiom that consciousness is more being than knowing is profoundly pertinent.  
 
      There is a world constantly at play in my sub-conscious, the consistently shifting world of my 
concerns, practices and involvements. These are for the most-part unresolved and ongoing and all of us 
have anticipations and expectations which cannot be guaranteed. Here we move towards the summation of 
our argument. The multiple concerns and practices in which we are existentially embedded gain structure 
and sense from the linguistic and symbolic meanings around which they are built.  The polyvalence and 
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indeterminacy of linguistic meaning suggests that the structures through which we and our practices 
understand themselves are always vulnerable to being destabilised.   The values and meanings attached to 
a set of signs and symbols in one practice can have a destabilising effect on the meanings given to the 
same symbols in another practice. An emergent meaning in one horizon can prompt an emergency in 
another. Here we arrive at the thrust of Iser’s contention that interpretation is performative, it has effects 
and brings things about. The hermeneutical dialectic which Iser anticipates can be outlined as follows.  
    
     There is no beginning to our hermeneutical involvements. We are from the start already in play, we are 
all situated subjects located in streams of unresolved experience. To achieve a degree of sense for what is 
at play within experience, our involvement with a community or with a creative concern, involves 
projecting a sense of completeness capable of rendering its complexity into an intelligible structure. In 
formal terms, because of the incommensurability of Being and knowing, the interpretive projection of 
completeness will fail but, as we have seen, that is not the point. It is what the failure of the projection 
gives rise to that is key. The failure of an interpretation, that is, its displacement by another perspective, is 
an effect of the emergence of other ways of thinking. Whilst it may disrupt the interpretation projected it 
can, at the same time, quite serendipitously re- configure the fields of our other unresolved concerns in 
potentially revealing and transformative ways. This is one of the most powerful hermeneutical arguments 
in favour of the humanities. Immersing oneself in those patterns of the meaningful that constitute poetry, 
literature music and history is to absorb figures of reasoning able to expand repertoires of response to 
those moments of failure that challenge any practice existential, professional or creative.   
    
      Here we arrive at the redemption of hermeneutic failure: it is redeemed by its adjunctive effects. The 
projection of a determinate interpretation with its anticipation of completeness will in formal terms 
necessarily fail. But the performative element of that failure - the adjunctive effects it gives rise to - will 
potentially trigger new and unpredicted alignments of meaning across the numerous horizons of concern 
that constitute our being. What does this notion of hermeneutic effects point to? 
 
5: Towards a Participatory Hermeneutics. 
 JBSP:  HERMENEUTICS ISSUE  14 
     
    Developing Gadamer’s linguistic ontology, we argue that the participant-subject is always ‘positioned’, 
always part situated within a larger nexus. The participant subject is an embodied subject, not standing 
apart from the sum of relations that constitutes its environment but simultaneously acting on and being 
acted on by it. Such a subject is always located within a situation that is both historical and linguistic and, 
in Gadamer’s words, “to throw light on it (the situation) is a task that is (can)never entirely completed” 
(TM 1979 269).  To be is to do: participatory-subjects are in effect clusters of activities, not beings that 
act but actions that have a being insofar as they are effective agencies: their essence is a consequential 
construct, an effect of and not a pre-requisite for action. Subject-participants are, to use Nietzsche’s 
phrase, multiplicities that act as subjects but are not actual subjects. They are processes of assemblage or 
com-posure that gather received events and possible courses of action into one constantly revising story, 
identity, or practice. The situated subject is located within a horizontality of multiple dimensions, a 
complex environment of personal, national, linguistic, professional interests and concerns. Because of its 
placement in such a “thick” environment of concerns, the situated subject is cross hatched with the 
competing anticipations and expectancies of the different practices that constitute its being.  
 
    The quest for a unifying sense to each practice or project involves the subject of that practice in the 
projection a guiding leitmotif, an anticipation of completeness. The situated subject is a dialogical, 
negotiable being. The other can see things about my perspective, my interpretive projections I cannot 
see.The situated subject needs the other to present perspectives enabling it to think differently about the 
possibilities within its own. Each (dialogical) position is unfinished and yet unfinishable, “constantly 
under pressure” to open itself to what is other than itself. The quest for completion is of course impossible 
but here the impossibility of hermeneutics is redeemed. The situated-subject is grounded in what 
transcends it, in the infinite nexus of historical, linguistic and cultural meanings whose horizons articulate 
the tensions of its being. Each “position” is dependent upon and resonant with the sum of inter-actions it 
is part of. The quest for completeness is thus provocative: though it will fail, its failure is synonymous 
with the emergence of alternative alignments of potential meaning. Though such emergences may 
displace the initial projection of completeness, they will trigger because of metaphorical associations or 
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analogous lines of reasoning, other patterns of meaning capable of bringing to resolution to other fields of 
hermeneutic engagement.  However,  if the existential purpose of hermeneutics is to trigger alignments of 
meaning capable of offering resolution to the ambiguities of experience, has not my argument also failed 
on a number of levels?  
    
       Of course such resolutions are temporary and subject to alteration by the ever changing horizons from 
which they emerge. All understanding shifts in time and so, as we have seen, any one projection will fail 
but that is not the point. Viewed collectively, such failures disclose an emergent pattern or continuity of 
involvements. The emergence of such narratives are a truth-effect of hermeneutic failures. Say a new 
emergent interpretation of the ambiguities of an experiential manifold arises. What justifies that 
interpretation when logically speaking it is but one of many possible contenders? Here we meet, at last, 
the sceptical ghost haunting this paper: the Kantian ghost of metaphysics past.  
 
     Hermeneutics is so often condemned as failing because its claims to truth can never comply with the 
strict truth-criterion demanded by methodological disciplines.  If the later are understood 
epistemologically and include universality, completeness, wholeness, then hermeneutics is judged as 
failing because its truth-claims can never capture an unconditional world of truth and meaning that there 
can, infact, be no experience of. It is becoming increasingly clear that hermeneutics has been wrongly  
condemned by deconstructive theory for failing to provide what it could never offer -  a universal theory 
of meaning and its justification. However, hermeneutics is not theory alone and any attempt to render it as 
a philosophy of meaning must fail:  philosophy will never be adequate to the complexities of experience. 
Gadamer did not fully see the consequences of this: to establish a philosophy of hermeneutics is to 
commit hermeneutical hubris. To reflect philosophically, however, on what hermeneutic practices do and 
to meditate on their effects is quite another matter. Hermeneutics reflection evolves from the fall-out of 
“evidentiary” experience. Evidentiary experiences be they in art, ethics, or music are in one sense 
“beyond interpretation” - any single interpretation will in formal terms fail. Yet the elusiveness of such 
experiences demands a plurality of interpretations, a montage of different genres and textual approaches 
all of which will bring into conscious inter-action much of what is at play in such experience. The future 
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of hermeneutics looks towards an inter-relational perspectivism grounded in the ontologically explosive 
nature of evidentiary truth. Even if we grant both that evidentiary experience is at the root of the 
hermeneutic quest  and that evidentiary experience requires multiple forms of cognition, what justifies the 
place of one interpretation amongst a community of others? What justifies one interpretation over 
another? Without being facetious, the answer is straight forward; the appropriate interpretation announces 
itself and is hermeneutically speaking, self-selecting. Keeping the priority of experience over theoretical 
reflection in mind, we can now draw on the full significance of Gadamer’s notion of the 
Wahrheitsanspruch  (the truth claim of art or literature though plainly evidentiary experience is not 
restricted by disciplinary boundaries). 
     The Wahrheitsanspruch does not concern a work’s epistemological status (whether what it proclaims 
as true can be accepted as a legitimate truth claim). The Wahrheitsanspruch is not a proposition, nor is it 
an experience of “truth” (as if the latter were separable from the content of the work). Rather the 
Wahrheitsanspruch is that astonishing moment of address, when a work seizes our attention and compels 
us to attend to it. If one of the classical meanings of truth concerns that which commands our assent, we 
might say that when an art work speaks to us we truly experience being addressed. Two qualifications are 
necessary here. First, what presents itself to me in evidentiary experience is logically speaking only one 
way of seeing the world: others are (in formal terms) perfectly feasible. The question has to be why this 
evidentiary experience rather than another.  Why not a “road to Mecca” experience rather than a “road to 
Damascus” revelation? Second, to recognise the Wahrheitsanspruch that a specific work makes upon me 
does not place that experience beyond interpretation: to the contrary, as an evidentiary experience it is 
open to multiple interpretations. The evidentiary nature of the Wahrheitsanspruch re-affirms the 
ontological priority of experience over theory such that, to use Gadamer’s phrase, the Wahrheitsanspruch 
of art, of music or of the other upon us occurs contrary “to our willing and doing.” To conclude from this 
that the Wahrheitsanpruchen of history or literature are logically arbitrary and are therefore without 
serious cognitive content is an obvious error. Admittedly the Wahrheitsanspruch of a work has no strict 
logical necessity to it but given that it is one of a vast range of logically possible manifestations of 
meaning, why does a given Wahtheitsanspruch address a hermeneutic spectator in the way that it does?  
Ontologically speaking, the Wahrheitsanspruch is far from arbitrary: we might even say that the 
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hermeneutic subject who undergoes an evidentiary experience is already disposed (or is hermeneutically 
inclined) towards the reception its address. 
 
The Wahrheitsanspruch is hermeneutically non-arbitrary because: 
• The sheer force of the Wahrheitsanspruch  - that it speaks so directly to problematics at play 
within a continuity of concerns - demonstrates its cognitive force, that is, it brings us to see old 
problems differently or to offer resolution to unresolved difficulties at play within and across the 
different horizons which articulate the terrain of our being. 
 
• The Wahrheitsanspruch is far from arbitrary because it is a moment within a process of non-
identical repetition. It can reveal something missed, over-looked, dimly hoped for: something is 
recognised but in a new guise or idiom.  
 
•  The Wahrheitsanspruch can certainly be aesthetically compelling in that it brings a cluster of on-
going concerns and experiences into a coherent structure. However, the issue is whether what is 
aesthetically persuasive is also cognitively compelling, that is, whether what is brought into an 
aesthetic order makes sense of the material that is brought into pattern and order. In other words, 
the plausibility of the cognitive claim of a Wahrheitsanspruch depends upon the extent to which it 
reveals itself to be consistent with  the structures it has transformed.  
 
• The Wahrheitsanspruch is far from arbitrary as deconstruction claims but shows itself as a 
legitimate cognitive development of possibilities at play within the multiple horizons our of which 
it springs.  It can be strongly argued that hermeneutics has to overcome its sense of inferiority 
before the claims of a legitimising methodology. Nothing can legitimate a Wahrheitsanpruch a 
priori. It demonstrates its own legitimacy by asserting itself in the event, that is, by recognisably 
transforming and thereby making manifest what is at play within our horizons of concern. 
Hermeneutics needs to explicitly return to and articulate such rhetorical forms of reasoning. 
 
      An objection to the claim that “hermeneutics is impossible” is that it concedes too much to the 
negativity of deconstructive criticism. Rather than accepting its critique, its pre-suppositions should be 
dismantled, allowing lingering doubts about hermeneutics’ credibility to be dispersed. The sentiment 
within this objection is well taken but arguably misplaced for two reasons. First, deconstructive and post-
structuralist criticism is on many levels right to attack hermeneutics. The terms of its operations are in 
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need of re-thinking but the mode of attack is skewed and obscures what can be meaningfully re-
constructed in the discipline. Second, the problem with deconstructive criticism is not that it is incorrect: 
it is right to insist that there can be no final interpretation but where it goes wrong concerns a failure of its 
own making. Critics of hermeneutics often fail to grasp that what it perceived as a disabling limit to 
interpretation is infact the enabling presupposition of the endlessly transformative nature of 
interpretation. Of course, no interpretation can grasp or be commensurable with an object (Sache) whose 
meaning and significance is of infinite in determination. Finite understanding can never grasp such an 
object: there is no such object to be grasped. Deconstructive thought cannot criticise philosophical 
hermeneutics for failing to get to the bottom of things since the very supposition of final meaning is 
erroneous. What deconstruction identifies as the formal impossibility of hermeneutics actually establishes 
the practical possibility of hermeneutics. What delimits and seemingly negates the formal possibility of 
hermeneutics - the inability of interpretation to exhaust the infinite determinations of its object -  enables 
hermeneutics to extend its finite understandings infinitely. Completeness and infinity are not features of 
understandable objects but of the endlessly repeatable processes of understanding. If hermeneutic 
understanding were understood as just the linear progress towards an ever more accurate account of a 
final truth, no recursive looping would be possible. As a consequence, the reflective understanding which 
emerges from recursive looping could not itself occur. Thus, the points of continuity and difference, the 
development of narrative patterns and points of re-appraisal which constitute the emergence of 
hermeneutic consciousness would not themselves emerge. Inotherwords, hermeneutic understanding 
depends upon the endless recurrence of non-identical processes of repetition. Hermeneutic truth is not 
arrived at as the intended terminus of a methodological enquiry. Rather hermeneutic truth is a practice 
based emergence, the adjunctive effect  of recursive looping within a given practice. Deconstructive 
criticism of hermeneutics for failing to ever arrive at the truth is dangerous not because its claim is wrong 
but because it blurs what is really at stake, i.e. promoting the conditions which enable the emergence of 
hermeneutic truth. Philosophical hermeneutics responds to Nietzsche’s question concerning the value of 
truth: the ‘truth” is valuable not in-itself but for what its pursuit gives rise to, namely, the unexpected and 
potentially transformative emergence of hermeneutic truths. These points return us to our main position. 
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    The argument that hermeneutics is in formal theoretical terms impossible does not concede too much to 
theory, rather it re-connects matters of theoretical reflection with the subject-matters of experience. 
Hermeneutics asserts the primacy of experience over theoretical reflection. The Wahrheitsanspruchen of 
art, poetry and history are evidential experiences. Iser comments, evidential experience is almost like an 
assault: it happens to us, and we are inside it.16  The enormity of such Wahrheitsanspruchen demand 
multiple forms of interpretation and theoretical inquiry to tease out what is at play within them. Theory is 
not opposed to evidential experience, to the contrary, philosophical reflection is the mid-wife to evidential 
experience, drawing out and rendering more explicit what is at play within it and thereby inducing other 
possibilities within such experience to arise.   
 
        On the basis of these  arguments we can argue that Vattimo is right: “the task of contemporary 
hermeneutics… consists in the affirmation that the rational (argumentative) interpretation in history is not 
scientific in the positivistic sense (objective) and yet neither is it purely aesthetic and subjective. This 
opens the door to re-covering a form of rhetorical (hermeneutical) reasoning which is free of the 
dominance of rationalist and positivist form of reasoning.”  Now that the objective co-relative of rhetoric - 
the ideal of pure reasoning - has waned, rhetoric can be recognised as the mode of practical reasoning that 
it is. Once the evidentiary nature of experience is accepted and that multiple forms of cognition and 
interpretation are required to grasp albeit provisionally what is at play in such experience, then all the 
devices of rhetorical reasoning can be brought back to sharpen, challenge if not justify the way in which 
any one interpretation can add to and illuminate a larger body of interpretation. One thinks for example of 
Komparatistiks, Kombinatoriks, Nomothetiks and Konjekturalkritik.17 However, it is not the attainment of 
such rhetorical justification that matters, but the effects of its pursuit, what it gives rise to in bringing to 
light what is at play within experience. The adoption of such principles and practices remains but a 
device, to prompt what is presently withheld to come into disclosure.  Over the gates of hermeneutics 
future should be written “hermeneutics deciphers palimpsests, projects the meaningful, uncovers the 
                                                 
16 Wolfgang Iser, The Significance of Fictionalising, (Anthropoetics 111, no. 2 (Fall 1997, Winter 1998) at 
www.anthropoetics.ucla.edu./ap0302/iser_fiction.htm 
17 Johann Figl, Die Vorbereitung zur Hermeneutik und Kritik, Nietzsche Studien, 1981/2 Vol 10/11, p. 408-41.  
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hidden, disputes the given and imagines the possible.”18 In this, the impossible quest of hermeneutics 
remains and underwrites the practical task of transformation. 
 
 
Nicholas Davey 
University of Dundee 
 
 
Nicholas Davey (b.1950) was educated at the Universities of York, Sussex and Tübingen. He has lectured 
at the City University London (I976-79), at the University of Manchester (I989-80), the University of Wales 
Institute Cardiff Institute (I981-I996) and is presently Professor of Philosophy and at the University of 
Dundee. His principal teaching and research interests are in aesthetics and hermeneutics. At the University 
of Wales and at the University of Dundee he established new graduate and post-graduate courses in art and 
philosophy and as Dean built the School of Humanities. He has published widely in the field of  aesthetics 
and hermeneutic theory. His book, Unquiet Understanding, Gadamer and Philosophical 
Hermeneutics,(2006), is published with the State University Press of New York and his book Unfinished 
Worlds, Hermeneutics, Aesthetics and Gadamer is now published with Edinburgh University Press (2011). 
He is currently writing a monograph Negative Hermeneutics concerning a philosophical defence of 
hermeneutics and the humanities.  
                                                 
18  Ben De Bruyn, Wolgang Iser, A Companion, Berlin, De Gruyter, 2012, p.253. 
